The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control

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Abstract:
The alleged crisis in US civil-military relations has revived a long-standing theoretical debate about the determinants of civil control. So far, the debate has followed the thought of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Feaver defines the basic problematique both the Huntingtonian and Janowitzean theories attempt to explain--how to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.

Full Text:

The alleged crisis in American civil-military relations has revived a long-standing theoretical debate in the field.l How does a civilian government control its military? Samuel Huntington's answer, by maximizing military professionalism, sparked a debate that continues to divide civil-military theoreticians forty years later. The debate continues despite the fact that Huntington's chief antagonists from the sociological school founded by Morris Janowitz offer essentially a very similar answer. In this article, I define the basic problematique both Huntingtonian and Janowitzean theories attempt to explain. Next I critically evaluate and call into question the continued validity of key propositions of each theory and especially each's reliance on "professionalism." The article concludes with a brief summary of the criteria that should guide the development of a new theory of civilian control.

The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the

civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do. This is a special case of the general problem of political agency: how do you ensure that your agent is doing your will, especially when your agent has guns and so may enjoy more coercive power than you do? This long-standing challenge has gained greater salience recently as American civil-military relations have entered a phase of particular acrimony. The acrimony was manifested in the remarkable degree of public vitriol directed at the person of the Commander-in-Chief by uniformed officers, especially in off-the-record comments early in President Clinton's tenure.2 The acrimony was further manifested in a debate over whether senior military officers have usurped too much authority in shaping military and political-military decisions on the size and shape of the post-Cold War defense establishment, the use of force, and other strategic matters.3 Finally, the acrimony has been seen in friction generated by two simultaneous and contradictory trends. On the one hand, there has been a divergence in the sociology of civilian and military establishments as fewer political elites have direct experience or personal connections with the military; on the other hand, there has been a convergence in civilian and military functions as traditional military threats to U.S. interests fade and nontraditional missions increasingly occupy military energy and resources.4

The rhetoric of the public debate, peppered with references to scandals, coups, and a military "out of control," suggests that civilian leaders in the United States are facing an insubordinate military. Such rhetoric naturally directs attention to the theory of civil-military relations in order to understand the forces that shape the interactions of civilian and military institutions and to appreciate the determinants of civilian control. Civilmilitary relations theory, however, remains underdeveloped. The empirical literature is vast and informative but it has advanced primarily along theoretical lines of analysis laid out by Huntington and Janowitz thirty or forty years ago. Theoretical debates, such as they are, largely recapitulate Huntington's claims about professionalism or Janowitz' early critique of Huntington. Despite their prominence, however, neither Huntington nor Janowitz adequately explain the problem of civilian control and so both are uncertain guides for future study and policymaking. Specifically, as I outline below, they skirt crucial aspects of the civilian control problem and make claims about other aspects that subsequent empirical research has challenged. In short, an alternative theory of American civil-military relations is called for.

The Civil-Military Problematique

The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection. The point is made with resort to the common parable of a state of nature where individuals fend for themselves.5 Here the protector and the protectee are one and the same. There is no civil-military dilemma, even if life is, as Hobbes said, "nasty, brutish, and short."6 As political philosophers since Plato have recognized, however, once individuals band together in community, the problem of agency arises in two stages. The first stage involves the delegation of decisionmaking authority from each individual to the collective, as represented by some leader or council of leaders. The second stage is the central one for the civil-military problematique and involves the delegation of the fighting

mission from each individual to a specialized group. Perhaps for a time it is possible to imagine that everyone in the band fights until the threat is gone or the mission is accomplished, at which time everyone returns to normal civilian life. But at some point, and well before the emergence of professional militaries, divisions of labor creep in. In theory, the initial division of labor is between those who will fight when needed and the rest who will stay behind regardless. At this stage, since the coercive force is only created when a threat emerges or when a perceived need for aggressive action arises, the problem of control is reduced considerably but not eliminated. The group must decide who is going to do the fighting and this involves calculations of risk: how big a threat are we facing and how big a protective institution do we need? At the same time, the designation of potential fighters constitutes, at a minimum, the creation of coercive power that ever after poses a latent threat to the liberty of the group.

As the community grows, and as the art and science of war advance, role differentiation and skill specialization will increase. Just as individuals will come to rely on a few producers to provide the goods society needs to subsist, so will they rely on the designated defenders to provide security for the group. Of course, this subgroup can be more or less representative of society as a whole; the burden of defense can be shared equally across all subgroups or it can fall disproportionately on certain elements (e.g., aristocrats or certain ethnic groups). In every case, however, the actual fighting will be done by some subset of society and that subset will be, by definition, the military. Arrangements will be made to secure the services of this group (voluntary inducements, peer pressure, draft); it will be equipped with the necessary wherewithal to protect society (threats estimated, responses gauged, resources allocated), but guarantees that this fighting force will not turn on its creators will be negotiated (the problem of civilian control). In short, societal protection will be institutionalized and this mythical society will directly encounter the civilmilitary problematique.

Two central and potentially conflicting principles can be deduced from the problematique. First, the military must be strong enough to prevail in the society's wars. The whole purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for military force either to attack other groups or simply to ward off attacks by others. The military institution is not a political tool of first resort, given the tremendous financial and human costs associated with its use, but different societies will have different propensities for the use of force. Regardless of how cavalierly it is used, however, it is especially kept for emergencies. Like an automobile's airbag, then, the military primarily exists as a guard against disaster. It must always be ready even if it is never used. Moreover, its strength must be sized appropriately to the threats confronting the polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military institution may be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger inviting outside aggression; strong enough in appearance to threaten powerful enemies, but not strong enough in fact to defend against their predations. Alternatively, it could lull leaders into a false confidence, lead them to rash behavior, and then fail in the ultimate military contest. From this first principle, then, one can further deduce a number of features of the ideal-type military: it is tasked with defending the body politic; it is ready for extreme emergencies and for lesser tasks as desired; and it is

sufficiently strong and properly oriented to meet the peculiar threats facing that particular polity.7

The second basic principle is logically related but practically in tension with the first: just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But because the military has this coercive power, it may also have the ability to enforce its will on the community that created it in the first place. A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civilmilitary relations theory. Less obvious, but just as sinister, is the ability of the military to destroy society by draining it of resources in a quest for ever greater strength as a hedge against the enemies of the state. Yet another concern is that a rogue military could involve the society in wars and conflicts contrary to society's interests, either directly as in the hypothetical precipitation of a nuclear war or indirectly as in the World War I case of rigid mobilization schedules that came to dictate state policy in the final days of the crisis. And, finally, there is a concern over the simple matter of obedience: even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests? Several more features of the ideal military are suggested by this second principle: it is subordinate to the political authority of the state; while it should be large enough to protect against threats, its size and draw on society's resources must be bounded.

These two principles, inherent in the specialization that results from communal living, obtain even in polities where the uniformed military is in control of all political affairs. Even in such cases, however, the problem of agency often arises if the coup leaders frame their role as being servants of the state or the higher collective. In this sense, the military is adding an additional layer of agency to the story told at the beginning of this section: individuals delegate to a collective, the collective delegates to a regime, and the regime delegates to the fighters. The coup happens, according to this logic, when the fighters determine that the regime has violated the will/ interests of the collective. The fighters still see themselves in theory as the agents of the state (albeit not terribly subservient agents). More directly, the very act of political power recreates the second delegation-agency problem, even though the fact that both political leaders and the fighting groups alike wear uniforms may make it seem as if the division of labor does not exist. For even here, responsibility is divided between those who do the fighting and those who remain behind to wield political power.8 Wearing the same uniform does not prevent those who stay behind from worrying about whether the fighters are adequate to defend them or whether the fighters are liable to turn around and unseat them, as the prevalence of coups and counter-coups in military dictatorships attests.

These two principles are seen most starkly, however, in democracies where the prerogatives of the protectee are thought to trump the protectors at every turn-where the metaphorical delegation of political authority to agents is enacted at regular intervals through the ballot box. Democratic theory is summed in the epigram that the governed should govern. People may choose political agents to act on their behalf, but that should

in no way mean that the people have alienated their political privileges. Most of democratic theory is concerned with devising ways to insure that the people can remain in control even as the business of government is conducted by professionals. Civil-military relations are just a special extreme case, involving designated political agents controlling designated military agents.

It follows that the hierarchy of de jure authority favors civilians against the military, even in those cases when the underlying distribution of de facto power favors the military. Regardless of how strong the military is, civilians are supposed to remain the political masters. While decisionmaking may in fact be politics as usual-the exercise of power in pursuit of ends- it is politics within the context of a particular normative conception of whose will should prevail. Civilian competence, in the general sense, extends even beyond their competence in a particular sense.9 This is the nub of the democratic alternative to Plato's philosopher king. Although the expert may understand the issue better, the expert is not in a position to determine the value the people will attach to different issue outcomes. In the civil-military context, this means that the military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat for a given level of risk, but only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for society. The military can say we need such and such level of armaments to have a certain probability of being able to defend successfully against our enemies, but only the civilian can say what probability of success society is willing to pay for. The military can describe in some detail the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy, but only the civilian can decide whether to feel threatened and so how or even whether to respond. The military quantifies the risk, the civilian judges it. Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong.

The two central principles-the need to have protection by the military and the need to have protection from the military-are in tension because efforts to assure one side complicate efforts to assure the other. If a society relentlessly pursues protection from external enemies, it will bankrupt itself. If society minimizes the strength of the military so as to guard against a military seizure of political power, it leaves itself vulnerable to predations from external enemies. It may be possible to procure a goodly amount of both-certainly the United States seems to have had success in securing a large measure of protection both by and from the military-but tradeoffs at the margins are inevitable.

Even if a society succeeds in simultaneously achieving adequate levels of assurance against utter collapse at either extreme-battlefield collapse and coup- problems still remain within the middle range of policy: ensuring that the military is capable of doing what you ask them to do and also willing to do what you ask them to do. Thus, "solving" the problem of coups does not solve, in the sense of neutralize, the general problem of control. Will the military still do what we ask them to do? A military could never coup and yet still systematically undermine civilian control. For instance, it is hardly a victory for civilian control if the military threatens to coup, extracts concessions from the civilian government, and then does not coup. Even if the military never waves the threat of a coup, the basic problematique remains. On the one hand, the military may not coup

because it is so weak or demoralized that it cannot achieve its basic protection mission. On the other hand, it may not coup (although it has the power to do so) but yet resist direction or abuse delegated authority in other ways. An adequate treatment of the civil-military problematique, then, must recognize that civilian control is more nuanced than simply preventing coups.

The civil-military problematique is logically prior to all other national security issues that are, in a sense, instrumental values-they are appraised according to how they relieve or exacerbate the central civilmilitary challenge. Debates over force structure and strategy are debates over how best to ensure that society is protected. Debates over personnel and organization are at some level debates over how best to ensure that the military is subservient to civilian authority. The further one is removed from the mythical state of nature, however, the more tenuous seems the link, as evidenced by the debates that have had special salience in the post-Cold War American security environment. The debate over lifting the ban on open homosexuality seemed largely unrelated to the need to protect society from external enemies or the need to protect society from the military. Likewise, debates over military base closures appear to have more to do with the electoral survival of individual politicians than they do with the survival of the state. Yet opponents of lifting the ban argued, inter alia, that the ban was needed to preserve troop morale that was critical for military success on the battlefield. Proponents of lifting the ban argued that military resistance was a threat to civilian control. The base closure issue is set against the backdrop of an even larger debate over how to downsize after the Cold War without cutting military capabilities to a dangerously low level. In other words, even in a country as manifestly secure as the United States after the end of the Cold War, debates about defense policy are cast against the backdrop of the central problem of assuring that the military is both strong enough to protect and pliant enough to do what civilians order them to do.

The political salience of these secondary issues, however, points to an important problem for civil-military relations theory: over time the military has come to serve multiple purposes. In the brief thought experiment discussed above, the military was invented as a protection device against external enemies. This remains its original and logically primary mission. Once created, however, the military institution can be a vehicle for advancing any number of other societal goals. The military is a tool with a unique and defining mission of the exercise of coercive power. But in the process of creating an institution capable of exerting coercive power, society has necessarily, if unintentionally, created an instrument that has a number of auxiliary capabilities. The military has the ability to execute manpower-intensive state programs, notably construction and disaster relief. Civilians can use the military to redistribute wealth, via the defense budget, to particular regions or corporate interests. And it has the ability to address questions of social injustice, by leveling the playing field for disadvantaged social groups, strategically distributing wealth and opportunity, and even coercively changing individual attitudes (through enforced sensitivity training).

These auxiliary capabilities complicate the civil-military problematique. Whereas originally the task was to optimize a military posture that (merely) simultaneously guaranteed

protection against external and internal enemies, now the task is to do all that while also optimally exploiting these auxiliary capabilities. When the primary purpose of the military seems irrelevant because the state faces no pressing threat, the secondary purposes can loom so large as to eclipse the security mission-hence the recent prominence of nontraditional missions for the military. But it is not possible to sever the instrumental link to the civil-military problematique entirely, even in instances where the use of the military seems an end unto itself. For instance, it can be argued that the military, as a preeminent institution in society, should reflect societal values precisely and simply because that is what society values. This was the essence of the justification for lifting the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the military, and earlier efforts to expand opportunities for women and African-Americans: if we as a society say it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of these particular ascriptive features, then the military should not do so, period. But even these noninstrumental uses have instrumental implications for the primary protection role of the military. They may have a deleterious effect, as opponents have repeatedly argued, either weakening the military to make it less capable of defense or antagonizing the military and making it more threatening to civilian authority. Alternatively, they may have a beneficial effect in mobilizing a larger portion of societal resources, as proponents have argued. Even when their effect is not profound, it is nonetheless discernible and remains the logically prior point of evaluation for such proposals; unless a noneffect is known with confidence, it does not make sense to evaluate the noninstrumental costs and benefits in isolation.

The centrality of the civil-military problematique merits emphasis in the American context precisely because 220 years of apparently successful civil-military relations have obscured its importance. It is no accident that American civil-military relations have been a relatively dormant area for political scientists. They received considerable attention during the late 1940s and 1950s with several major studies,?o but have been largely ignored by political scientists ever since. The important exceptions have all, by and large, operated within frameworks established by the early Cold War theorists.ll Even the trauma of the Vietnam War proved insufficient to motivate a thorough reexamination by political scientists.l2 That is not to say that the field of civil-military relations theory has been dormant.l3 Comparativists have made civil-military relations a point of emphasis precisely because the ubiquity of coups and military dictatorships makes the problematique so obviously a principal issue for political studies in other countries.l4 But in the American context, it has been sociologists and political scientists operating within the sociological school who, following the Janowitz tradition, are responsible for the bulk of scholarship on American civil-military relations.l5 Their findings on the changes in military career tracks, on the challenges faced by military families, and on the nuances of military professionalism are of great sociological import but seem less relevant to political scientists concerned with the exercise of power between institutions. From a crass political science point of view, the American case seems uninteresting, occupying with dreary regularity the "stable," "harmonious," or "balanced," cell in whatever 2x2 table the typology generates.l6 Consequently, the political scientists interested in civil-military problems have been uninterested in American politics and those interested in American politics have been uninterested in civil-military relations.

Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, the history of American civil-military relations has been rich with conflict.17 The relationship could only be characterized as harmonious and stable if measured in terms of the extreme values of battlefield collapse or military coup. The traumas of a world war precipitated by a pathological civil-military relationship or a fragile political system brought down by a coup are indeed foreign to the American experience. But the politics of American civil-military relations have remained vigorous and tense. The pulling and hauling among interest groups, the authoritative allocation of scarce resources, the exercise of power in pursuit of interests-all these are readily evident in any historical examination of the American military experience. A theory that focuses only on coups will miss much of what is interesting about American civil-military relations.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of headline-grabbing tension inside the Washington beltway have underscored the need for such a theory. The dramatically changed geopolitical landscape has produced the same kind of strategic reassessment that spawned the post-World War II scholarship on American civil-military relations. So far, however, the renewed debate has been largely conducted within, and limited by, the prism of this older theory.Is Before advancing an alternative treatment, therefore, it is necessary to examine what the two dominant strands of American civil-military relations theory have to say about the civil-military problematique.

Huntington and Janowitz on the Civil-Military Problematique

Samuel Huntington's monumental The Soldier and the State was not the first major analysis of American civil-military relations after World War II, but it has had the greatest and most lasting influence.I9 It enjoys such longevity in part because it is a richly textured and insightful examination and in part because the American military, who endorse many (although not all) of its general conclusions, have made it the centerpiece of their training on civil-military relations.20 Even modern analyses of civil-military relations feel obliged to begin with a reference to Huntington's theory.21 As I will argue below, however, several of Huntington's core claims have not been born out by subsequent experience or empirical inquiry, so that his theory is best considered a point of departure rather than a stopping place in the study of American civil-military relations.

The focus of Huntington's study is the officer corps and the rise of professionalism. Although he does not develop it in such explicit terms, the civil-military problematique is central to his theory. He recognizes that there is a tension between the desire for civilian control and the need for military security. Indeed, his critique of certain forms of civilian control is based on his claim that they sacrifice protection against external enemies in order to minimize the power of the military and thus make civilian control more certain. His entire enterprise, however, is based on ". . . the methodological assumption. . . that, starting from certain premises concerning the nature and purpose of military institutions, it is possible to define in the abstract that particular type of equilibrium`objective civilian control'-which maximizes military security.22 In other words, Huntington recognizes that some efforts to enhance civilian control can undermine the ability of the military to be an effective fighting force, but he believes the tension is avoidable. Following his way can

provide, or rather is the only way to provide, maximum amounts of both. In modern political science jargon, Huntington here treats the pattern of civilian control as an independent variable explaining his dependent variable of military security. The more objective civilian control, the more military security, begging the question: what determines the pattern of civilian control?

From American experience Huntington identifies two shaping forces, "functional and societal imperatives," the former referring to threats to society's security and the latter referring to "the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society." He further breaks the societal imperative into two components, ideology and structure, the former referring to the prevailing world-view (liberal antimilitary, conservative pro-military, fascist pro-military, or Marxist antimilitary), and the latter referring to the legal-institutional framework, e.g.,the Constitution, which guides political affairs generally and civil-military affairs specifically.23 Huntington's imperatives are the independent variables that explain changes in the dependent variable of civilian control, which itself becomes an explanatory variable to predict changes in the level of military security. However, since Huntington says both societal imperatives were unchanging in American history-he calls them the structural and ideological constants-the functional imperative, external threat, bears the full explanatory load for any change in civilian control or level of military armament.24 When external threat is low, liberal ideology produces the "extirpation" pattern of civil-military relations: the virtual elimination of military forces. When external threat is high, liberal ideology produces the "transmutation" pattern: refashioning the military in accordance with liberalism so that the military "lose their peculiarly military characteristics."25 Transmutation works for short spasms of concentrated military effort, such as a world war, but will not assure adequate military capability over the long term.

The motivation for his study, the "crisis of American civil-military relations," is Huntington's view that the functional imperative in the form of the Soviet threat imposed a requirement on the United States for a large military establishment of the first rank, but the societal imperative of traditional liberal antimilitary ideology frustrated efforts by political leaders to build the needed military forces and to leave them alone to do their job of providing national security. Huntington assumes, not unreasonably given the context in which he was writing, that the Soviet threat is a "relatively permanent aspect of the international scene." So, unlike World War II, this conflict will be long-running. He concludes, therefore, that the United States is doomed to build insufficient military forces unless it can change the societal imperative: "The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism." The American embrace of liberalism, Huntington avers, is "the gravest domestic threat to American military security."26 In other words, unless America changes its ideology, it is liable to prove inadequate to the task of meeting the Soviet threat over the long run.

Huntington's primary contribution, by his own measure, is the identification of a way of meeting the Soviet threat without losing civilian control. To be sure, Huntington's way involves a rejection of much of what may be considered the American way, liberalism, but it does not preclude securing a precious value that liberalism seeks to provide: the primacy

of the civilian over the military. Huntington's way would mean the loss of individualism, replaced with a communalism that would subordinate the good of the individual for the good of society. It might even mean the loss of the "tiresome monotony and the incredible variety and discordance of small-town commercialism."27 But it would not mean the loss of civilian control; it would not mean a military dictatorship. The reason, according to Huntington, is that there exists a form of civilian control that simultaneously maximizes military subordination and military fighting power, "objective civilian control." Objective control guarantees the protection of civilian society from external enemies and from the military themselves.

The key to objective control is military professionalism. Any action that furthers the professionalization of the military can be thought of as part of the objective control endeavor; all other actions belong to objective control's antithesis, subjective control, which produces transmutation. The primary objective control mechanism is "the recognition of autonomous military professionalism," respect for the independent military sphere of action. Interference or meddling in military affairs undermines military professionalism and so undermines objective control. Objective control weakens the military politically without weakening it in military terms, i.e. without degrading its ability to defend society, because professionalizing the military renders it politically sterile or neutral. Huntington's causal chain is as follows: autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which lead to secure civilian control. The heart of his concept is the putative link between professionalism and voluntary subordination. For Huntington, this is not so much a relationship of cause and effect as it is a definition: "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state."28 A professional military obeys civilian authority. A military that does not obey is not professional.

Huntington's treatment of the civil-military problematique and its manifestation in the American context, therefore, can be summed up in the following hypotheses:

HH1: Patterns of civilian control vary with changes in domestic ideology, domestic legal institutions, and external threat.

HH2: A liberal society (such as the United States) will not produce sufficient military might to survive the Cold War.

HH3: A professional military will become less and less professional the more its autonomy on military matters is violated.

HH4: A professional military will always remain subordinate to civilian authority.

How have these hypotheses withstood the test of time?

As noted earlier, Huntington claims there was no deviation in two of his key variables for the first 150 years of American history, indicating that patterns of civilian control in the

American experience must have varied with changes in the external threat. At a general level, this hypothesis seems to hold up; certainly the broad structure of American civilmilitary relations in the l9th century, when grand external threats were small, differed from the pattern in the 20th century when the United States faced global competitors in Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union.29 The Cold War, however, produces an interesting problem for Huntington's theory. From one perspective, the external threat remained relatively constant and, therefore, any change in the essential pattern of civil-military relations would have to be accounted for by a change in ideology (on which more below). On the other hand, perceptions of the threat (or at least the imminence of conflict) surely changed, perhaps producing changes in the pattern of civilian control. The problem is that it is difficult to operationalize adequately Huntington's intermediary dependent variable, objective/subjective control, so as to detect any expected changes. Civilmilitary conflict ebbed and flowed and so did perceptions of the threat. Huntington's measures cannot capture this, although his intuition suggests the presence of an interesting causal relationship. Huntington's first hypothesis may or may not stand up well to the empirical record, but the intuition underlying it needs a finer-grained formulation to capture all but the most basic variation in the American experience.3

As for the second hypothesis, there are in theory several possible evaluations. First, it is possible that Huntington might choose to defend a weaker form of this hypothesis: liberal societies will underproduce military protection relative to a theoretical optimum. This version is harder to falsify and so withstands most empirical critiques (including the one I levy below). On the other hand, the weaker form seems virtually unfalsifiable and so is of dubious theoretical value.

Moreover, Huntington did not in fact choose this formulation in subsequent defenses of his theory's predictive power, preferring instead to claim a second possible evaluation: that the prevailing ideology shifted from liberalism to conservative realism that permitted the United States to produce sufficient military security.31 In his words: "The argument advanced in The Soldier and the State in 1957 was that, given the existing international situation, `the requisite for military security,' was a shift from liberalism to a `sympathetically conservative' attitude toward the needs of military professionalism. To a surprising extent, that shift occurred." As evidence of this shift in favor of conservative realism, Huntington cited the publication of his own book, which indicated a change in the intellectual climate, and the fact that "a large number of other books by scholars and journalists appeared that treated the military with a respect, and military needs with a consideration, most unusual in American history." Moreover, Huntington claimed the early Cold War elites "shared, by and large, an understanding and appreciation of the role of military force with respect to foreign policy matched only by that of the Federalists in the 1790s and the `Neo-Hamiltonians' in the 1890s." Such an elite view was matched by parallel support among the mass public.32 Huntington supplemented this 1977 assessment, however, with a warning that the Vietnam war and related creeping antimilitarism was threatening to undo the temporary triumph of conservative realism, replacing it with traditional liberalism that would once again endanger U.S. security.33

Huntington's coding of the change in American values saves the explanatory power of his

theory, but I am not persuaded. To avoid a tautology, Huntington must measure a change in ideology independent of the military buildup and he must demonstrate changes across the domain of liberal ideology, not just in liberalism's traditional hostility to things military. The other aspect of liberalism Huntington stressed in his original theory was individualism. Arguably, individualism and hostility to the military changed over the past 40 years, but not in tandem. If anything, American society became even more individualistic, more antistatist, than it was when Huntington wrote.34 Moreover, the late 1950s and 1960s saw the flowering of the civil-rights movement and the establishment of a social welfare system, both dramatic expansions of classical liberalism's reach in American society. On the other hand, support for military institutions remained remarkably high throughout the Cold War. To be sure, respect for the military dipped during and after the Vietnam War, but it recovered and, by the end of the Cold War, the military seemed to be the societal/governmental institution enjoying the highest levels of public respect-without any corresponding widespread embrace of the other tenets of conservative realism. The question of whether the United States became more or less liberal (in Huntington's terms) during the Cold War merits further study, of course, but a cursory examination would suggest a third possible evaluation of his basic hypothesis about the incompatibility of liberalism with national security: Huntington was wrong either about the indivisibility of American liberalism or about the theoretical link between ideology and the ability to defend the state against external threats.35

The last two hypotheses have an equally controversial record. I have shown elsewhere that civilians consistently violated military autonomy on operational questions.36 Huntington identified and deplored a trend in the first decade after World War II of ever greater blurring of the roles of military and civilian; the trend has only continued and intensified since he wrote. Perhaps it reached its apex in Vietnam, when President Johnson picked bombing targets from the White House.37 Huntington's argument thus seems supported by the conventional wisdom that holds that the failure in Vietnam can be attributed to precisely this kind of micromanagement. To be sure, loss of security (battlefield failure) is at the end of Huntington's causal chain, so the apparent linkage between micromanagement and failure seems to support his case.38 But, for Huntington, intermediate steps in the causal chain are crucial: micromanagement should produce an unprofessional military that should produce a loss of security. The question remains whether the U. S. military is professional. To be sure, the Vietnam debacle stirred concern about morale and the general competence of the military-the so-called "hollow military." But by the measures of professionalism Huntington invokes-expertise, responsibility, and corporateness-it would seem the U.S. military remained highly professional despite extensive civilian intervention.39 In short, Huntington's dichotomous model of subjective and objective control needs at least one additional category, assertive control, that contemplates the simultaneous existence of civilian meddling and military professionalism.

As for the last hypothesis, the U.S. case alone does not disconfirm it. In broad terms, the military has remained subordinate to civilian authorities (although there is considerable pulling and hauling at the microlevel), and if one allows that the United States has a professional military, the hypothesis seems borne out. In comparative perspective,

however, the hypothesis that professionalism equals subordination has not held. S.E. Finer was perhaps Huntington's sternest critic on this point, arguing that his model reduces to the claim that armies that accept civilian control will not reject civilian control.40Subsequent comparative treatments have emphasized that military organizations that look professional by most measures have still conducted coups or otherwise subverted civilian authorities.41

Some of these problems with Huntington's theory were evident to his contemporaries. The gap between Huntington's prescriptions on military autonomy and the real world experience of an increasingly politicized military served as the point of departure for the second pillar of American civil-military relations theory, Morris Janowitz.42 Like Huntington, Janowitz focuses on the officer corps and the concept of professionalism. Janowitz rejects, however, the ideal-type division of labor that Huntington claims is essential to the professionalization of the military. Indeed, Janowitz documents in some detail the unavoidable politicization of the military given its global reach and the centrality of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry to both international and domestic politics.

He also explores in greater detail Huntington's functional imperative, the military-technical threat environment, and concludes that in the nuclear age the military must be prepared to deliver both strategic deterrence and limited war. This is a new military role and with it a new ideal-type military self-conception, the constabulary concept: "the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory... "43 Under this new concept, the distinctions between peace and war disappear and the military draws its inspiration more from the image of the police officer than the warrior, although Janowitz is careful to emphasize that the field of operations should be international, not domestic.

Arguably, the military has come to resemble the constabulary force identified by Janowitz, for better and for worse.an Janowitz recognizes that the politicization of the military carries with it an implicit, if not explicit, challenge to civilian supremacy. He worries that drift toward the constabulary force will increase military "frustration," although he never specifies what such frustration could itself lead to.45 In terms of the problematique, the most important contribution from Janowitz may be his discussion of how the politicized Cold War American military seeks to influence civilians and resist unwelcome policy direction. He notes that the military has matched the greater centralization on national security matters in the civilian executive branch (for example, the creation of the Department of Defense and National Security Council), with a more vigorous effort to gain access to the pinnacle of civilian power, the White House.46

Janowitz's vision was prescient, but he does not offer much in the way of an alternative theory of how civilians assure control at an institutional level, i.e., civilian control by the state. He recognizes that the constabulary force raises new problems of civilian control, but he concludes without much supporting analysis that the answer is greater civilian oversight at many more levels of military affairs-the very opposite of Huntington's prescription. The principal purpose of civilian oversight would be to develop standards

and criteria for evaluating military performance.47 He describes three main mechanisms whereby civilians exercise control within the Pentagon: the budget process, allocation of roles and missions, and advice to the President on foreign policy issues that have implications for the way the military is used. In discussing each, however, Janowitz argues that the military has largely found work-arounds to undermine the degree of civilian control offered.48 Moreover, mechanisms that others have seen as facilitating civilian control-interservice rivalry and the congressional budget hammer-he sees as evidence of civilian control failure.49 Even his list of potential new mechanisms for civilian control seems like an afterthought. He suggests stiffening congressional oversight procedures and developing longer tenure among senior civilian appointees in the executive branch. Likewise, he advocates specific limits on the kinds of lobbying permitted to quasimilitary groups like the Navy League. He also recommends civilian involvement in the development of standards of advanced professional military education.

He closes his discussion of civilian control with the claim that political control hinges "on the answer to the question why do officers fight"which Janowitz answers as professional ethics.so What is "professional ethics" other than "professionalism?" In fact, then, the primary control mechanism for Janowitz is the same values-based one that Huntington relied on: professionalism, albeit differently constituted. Janowitz' "pragmatic" professionalism is perhaps analytically richer than Huntington's "radical" professionalism.Sl Where Huntington offers a static ideal-type, Janowitz posits a dynamic professionalism changing with different sociological conditions. Janowitz admits of a politically aware officer corps with overlapping functions and expertise with civilian counterparts. Regardless of the form, however, both concepts are the heart of their respective theories and both bear the brunt of the prescriptive load (and therefore explanatory burden) for securing civilian control. Janowitz expands Huntington's professional ethic to include "a sense of self-esteem and moral worth," but he still relies on it to secure civilian control.52 Even the military sociologist Larson's sympathetic treatment of Janowitz leaves the tautological flaw in professionalism as civilian control intact and unremarked upon: ". . . the professional officer would be responsive to civil control because of law, tradition, and professionalism, and because of his integration with civil values and institutions."53 Thus, having rejected Huntington's analysis of the professional military, Janowitz claims that the military will obey in part out of Huntingtonian "self-imposed professional standards" and in part out of "meaningful integration with civilian values."54

In contrast with his extensive analysis of the sociology of the military officer, then, Janowitz offers only a brief laundry list of civilian control measures and ultimately falls back on the professionalism-equals-civiliancontrol theory advanced by Huntington.55 Of course, the Janowitzean school has advanced past this early construction, most notably in rejecting traditional notions of professionalism in favor of an emphasis on the military as an occupation.56 It is not clear, however, that the Janowitzean tradition has advanced far past the original understanding of the mechanisms of political control.

It is perhaps unfair to fault Janowitz, a sociologist, for not exploring more fully the quintessentially political question of controlling the instruments of force. Institutional obedience and delegation are political questions that lie somewhat outside the purview of

Janowitz's sociological viewpoint. Janowitz understood civilian control in terms of societal control rather than state or institutional control. State institutions play a secondary role as an extension of society, but societal control, measured in part as integration with society, was Janowitz's normative and empirical focus. Thus, a devotion to community, expressed in common values and self restraint, secures civilian control. Community, in turn, is built through the inculcation of these values within the military by education, not institutional devices. To political scientists, institutional civilian control is the heart of civil-military relations. To sociologists, civil-military relations is about the integration (or the absence of it) of civil and military institutions.

Where Huntington set out to describe ideal-type models, Janowitz sought to paint as accurate and detailed a portrait of the soldier as possible. He had the sociologist's interest in the institution qua institution, the group qua group, and he spawned a rich literature that has looked at how the military has shaped civilian society and vice versa. The Janowitzean tradition, however, quickly lost the civil-military problematique focus-if, indeed, that was ever its focus-and concerned itself with other important but only indirectly related questions.

The two deans of American civil-military relations thus offer alternative explanations of the American experience, yet, surprisingly, neither offers an adequate treatment of the civil-military problematique. Huntin ton's work comes closest, but, as I have argued, it draws erroneous inferences and makes predictions that have not proven accurate. Janowitz offers a wealth of insights into the nature of the military and its position in society. His descriptions of likely areas of friction are in the main accurate. But, excepting his recognition that even professional and generally subordinate military institutions will seek ways to influence if not manage civilian leaders, he made remarkably little advance over Huntington on the all-important question of civilian control.

Both focus heavily on what Larson calls internal mechanisms for civilian control, values or professionalism variously specified, while slighting the external measures of traditional administrative theory. Larson applauds this values focus, dismissing external measures as unwieldy given the size and scope of the post-World War II military establishment? Indeed, the problematique leads logically to a prominent place for these internal measures. Since the military has the unique capacity to take over a polity by force, there is an inherent upper boundary to the efficacy of external control mechanisms. At some level internal control mechanisms must play a role. In emphasizing the role of professionalism, however, both Huntington and Janowitz are vulnerable to charges of defining away the problem of civilian control.

A comprehensive theory of American civilian control must also incorporate interest-based and external control mechanisms and, from a theoretical and a policy perspective, these deserve special emphasis. In theoretical terms, such a focus is necessary because the interesting variation in cases like the United States, where the theoretically possible outcome of a coup has never in fact transpired, lies in the changing patterns of civilian control (as opposed to a changing existence of civilian control). In policy terms, even supposedly internal control measures like professionalism are themselves functions of

external choices such as accession policy, professional military education policy, and even policies designed to enhance social integration or separation. Thus, it makes sense to develop a theory that encompasses the entire basket of control measures and explains the factors that shape the ongoing process of civilian choices from among that basket.

Outlines of a New Theory

The complete development of such an alternative theory of American civilian control lies beyond the scope of this article.58 It is possible, however, to identify several benchmarks the theory should meet.

First, and most controversially, the theory must begin with analytically distinct civilian and military spheres. As Bernard Boene documents, the distinctness of and convergence between civilian and military spheres is a matter of great dispute.59 Indeed, one might say it is the principal preoccupation of the sociological school of civil-military relations theory. Undoubtedly, the spheres have converged in many ways over the past century. Technology has at once blurred distinctions between combatants and noncombatants and civilianized the martial skill set upon which soldiers rely to perform their craft. In the American context there is a marked political-military fusion at the highest levels of command on use of force policymaking.6 Indeed, Rebecca Schiff predicates her proposed "concordance" theory of civil-military relations on the idea that such separation of civilian and military institutions is theoretically and empirically flawed.61

Yet, Schiff's critique and proposed alternative itself offers an argument for continuing to use the distinction, especially for a theory purporting to explain American civil-military relations. For starters, she criticizes the distinction as "historically and culturally bound to the American case."62 Obviously, the ethnocentrism critique collapses if the project concerns, at least at the outset, American problems. More generally, however, Schiff's critique is actually limited to Huntington's version of distinctness, which contains a normative bias in favor of keeping the spheres as distinct as possible. She rejects Huntington's prescription, but does not dispute that there are analytically meaningful distinctions between the military and the nonmilitary. Indeed, Schiff's concordance theory itself relies upon the analytical distinction: she treats the military as distinct from the political leadership as distinct from the citizenry-introduction of the latter into the theoretical mix representing the heart of concordance theory's contribution to civil-military relations theory. Separating the civilian and military spheres in theory does not rule out greater or lesser convergence in practice. But if the spheres are not at least analytically distinct, the theory is no longer about civil-military relations.63

Second and perhaps obviously, the theory is not simply about documenting all relations between these two spheres (although that may also be an interesting area for study); rather, a theory about civilian control must explain one crucial aspect of those relations: the factors that shape how civilians exercise control over the military. The civil-military problematique, as I have defined it, is about the delegation of responsibility from the notional civilian to the notional military. It is about increasing or decreasing the scope of delegation and monitoring the military's behavior in the context of such delegation. And it

is about the military response to delegation, desire for more delegation, and even occasional usurpation of more authority than civilians intended. A serviceable theory of civilian control should address the conditions under which delegation happens and identify hypotheses about factors that shape the delegation in observable ways. Such a framework can incorporate a wide variety of patterns of relations. As discussed above, the delegation-agency focus can even encompass situations in which the putative military agents have dislodged the civilian regime and are bent on ruling the polity. Indeed, the only condition that this framework assumes away is the one in which there is no distinction whatsoever between the fighters and the nonfighters or where there is no institutionalization of that distinction. So long as there is a recognizable institution that is military, the problem of agency and delegation, the problem of the division of labor, and, consequently, the problem of civilian control arises. The topic, therefore, leads naturally to the political-institutional orientation suggested by Huntington. This is not so much a critique as a choice. Sociologists may well have an appropriate focus but for a different question than the political one suggested here.

Third and relatedly, the theory should transcend the concept of professionalization. As many critics have noted, Huntington's notion of professionalism defines away the very political problematique his framework identifies. As fewer critics have noted, Janowitz' more empirically grounded understanding of professionalism does much the same thing. The problem is with the concept itself. Professionalism is useful as a tool for identifying the myriad changes in the military craft as it evolves through premodern, modern, and now postmodern incarnations. It is useful even and perhaps especially in focusing attention on the attitudes and perspectives of the people who choose this vocation or are chosen for it. But as for explaining the problem of civilian control, I am not persuaded that the concept has more utility beyond that which Huntington, Janowitz, and especially Abrahamsson (following Finer) have already generated. Huntington and Janowitz argued that the ethic of subordination can be a powerful part of the professionalization of the military which, in turn, can contribute to civilian control. Abrahamsson correctly identified the other countervailing features of professionalization. A professional military is a complex and well-organized institution that has internalized certain nationalistic and conservative values, precisely the kind of organization that is likely to be more effective at resisting civilian direction when civilians and military disagree over the proper course of action than its converse (a simple, poorly organized institution with a weak corporate identity).64

In short, the professionalism glass is both half-full and half-empty and the professionalism-as-an-ethic argument cannot by itself answer which vision of the glass is the best. This is not a rational-interest critique of a values-based approach. On the contrary, an agency model of civilian control could incorporate rational-interest factors (for instance the costs of certain control measures) and values-based factors (the actors' normative conceptions of their role) and compare their relative weights. Better to separate various factors that scholars have grouped together under the umbrella concept of professionalism-size and complexity of the organization, homogeneity of viewpoint, and values-and identify their independent or collinear effects on the problem of civilian control.

Fourth and finally, the theory should be deductively derived before it is empirically tested against the historical record. The field has emphasized the opposite approach-identifying patterns in carefully researched cross-sectional or cross-temporal data. Such an inductive approach is responsible for much of the field's progress over the past several decades. Yet the wealth of empirical studies, many apparently disconfirming his key assertions or predictions, have not dislodged Huntington precisely because his theory consists of a few, tightly-reasoned, deductive propositions. From a philosophy of science perspective, Huntington's approach remains viable so long as there is no deductively superior alternative.

In conclusion, the observable friction in the relationship between civilians and the military has refocused attention on the theory of American civil-military relations. At its heart, the theory should address the civilmilitary problematique: the need to have an institution strong enough to protect civilians yet not so strong as to ignore civilian direction-in short, the problem of civilian delegation to and control of the military. The two deans of American civilmilitary relations, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, continue to dominate the theoretical debate, although their theories do not adequately explain the delegation/control dynamic. A new theory is needed and the outlines of it are evident in the specific weaknesses of the established rivals.

Notes

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1. Following on the heels of journalistic accounts of civil-military friction within the Clinton administration, several analysts have alleged that a serious rift has developed in the traditional relationship: John Cushman, "Bungling the Informal Contract," Pro

ceedings of the Naval Institute 120, 1 (January 1994): 10-13; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, 29-33. Colin Powell, John Lehman, William Odom, Samuel Huntington, and Richard Kohn, "Exchange on Civil-Military Relations." National Interest, 36 (Summer 1994): 23-31. Russell Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57, 5 (October 1993): 27-58.

2. "Who's in Charge of the Military?" New York Times, 26 January 1993, A18; John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy Just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, 1 February 1993, A10; Christopher Matthews, "Clinton, Drop Military Salute," The Arizona Republic, 22 March 1993, All; "The Military and the Commander-in-Chief, " transcript of ABC News Nightline, 30 March 1993; Barton Gellman, "Turning an About-Face Into a Forward March," Washington Post, 1 April 1993, Al; "Commander in Chief," Washington Post, 4 April 1993, C6; David S. Jonas and Hagen W. Frank, "Basic Military Leadership," Washington Post, 4 April 1993, C7; Eric Schmitt, "Clinton, in Gesture of Peace, Pops in on Pentagon," New York Times, 9 April 1993, A8; John Lancaster and Ann Dewey, "Storming the Pentagon," Washington Post, 9 April 1993, Al; John Lancaster, "Crowe Discounts Military Objection to Homosexuals," Washington Post, 11 April 1993, A16; Michael R. Gordon, "Joint Chiefs Warn Congress Against More Military Cuts," New York Times, 16 April 1993, A8; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, 7

May 1993, newswire; John Lancaster, "Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe," Washington Post, 8 June 1993, Al; John Lancaster, "Air Force General Sets Retirement," Washington Post, 19 June 1993, Al; Tom Philpott, "Blue Mood Rising," Army Times, 14 June 1993, 14-20; David H. Hackworth, "Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. the President," Newsweek, 28 June 1993, 24-25.

3. See especially Kohn, "Out of Control," and Weigley, "The American Military."

4. Charles Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, 4 (Winter 1992/93): 2-20; and Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake Forest Law Review 29, 2 (1994) 341-392.

5. This brief discussion aims solely to set up the problem of civilian control and is not intended to substitute for a comprehensive examination of the anthropological roots of war. For a useful if somewhat dated bibliography of that field see, R. Brian Ferguson, The Anthropology of War: A Bibliography (New York: Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, 1988).

6. To be sure, the mythical person may find that brandishing a sword to ward off enemies creates more enemies than it intimidates. This is the famous security dilemma and, while important, does not raise the issues of control that are of interest in this study. A closer analogy might be if the mythical person found that in brandishing the sword he was likely to lop off his own head.

7. Of course, the military may also be used in less urgent situations and for less urgent purposes, on which more in the text. At the most fundamental level, however, the

central purpose of the military is to protect society either through offensive or defensive wars.

8. In the conclusion, I return to the issue of the analytical distinction between civilian and military spheres-distinction that has become increasingly controversial as the functional and sociological differentiation between the two spheres has waxed and waned.

9. Civilians are morally and politically competent to make the decisions even if they do not possess the relevant expertise (technical competence). Robert Dahl, Controlling Nuclear Weapons (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

10. Jerome G. Kerwin, Civil-Military Relationships in American Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Harold D., Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950); Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr, The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History (New York: Putnam, 1956); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and The State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958).

11. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, Morningside Edition, 1991); Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and David Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-military Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

12. Two important exceptions are the body of scholarship examining the role of the president in authorizing the use of force and the literature on the military-industrial complex. The former, however, is largely juridical in perspective, analyzing the issue in terms of what is or is not allowed under the Constitution. See, for instance: Thomas T. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York: Liveright, 1974); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution

(Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1972); Jacob K. Javits, Who Makes War: The President vs. Congress (New York: Morrow, 1973); Abraham Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976). The military-industrial complex literature, in contrast, adopted a political science institutional focus, although its impact has been mixed. See Steven Rosen, ed., Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1973). See also, Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

13. And, of course, there is a vast empirical literature on matters touching on civilmilitary relations, including defense organizational reform, defense procurement, defense policymaking, and so on. My point is that there has been very limited theoretical development, particularly as it pertains to the mechanisms of how civilian institutions control military ones in the United States.

14. Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Timothy Colton, Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (New York: PrenticeHall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Claude Welch, ed., Civilian Control of the Military (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976); and Claude Welch, No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). While none accepts him uncritically, these scholars can be placed within the Huntingtonian tradition with the important and obvious exception of Finer. Perhaps the best comparative treatment within the Janowitz tradition is Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971).

15. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960; Free Press, 1971); also Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Woods, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988); and Samuel Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1975). For a review of this literature see: Bernard Boene, "How 'Unique' Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative Literature and Outline of a Synthetic Formulation," European Journal of Sociology 31, 1 (1990): 3-59; James Burk, "Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society." Armed Forces and Society 19, 2 (Winter 1993) 167186; and James Burk, "Major Trends in Civil-Military Relations" (paper presented at the conference on "Sociology and War" sponsored by the Triangle Universities Security Seminar, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 18 November 1994). There is, of course, still another macro sociological school that examines civil-military relations and state formation. The principal work in this area includes: Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); and Charles Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

16.. For example, Finer, Man on Horseback, especially 88-89; and Welch, Civilian Control of the Military.

17. Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force," in Donald Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, eds., U. S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1995), 113-144.

18. Recently, however, there have been efforts to reconstruct the theoretical edifice of

civil-military relations. Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral

Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing U.S. Civil-Military Relations" (paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995); and Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces & Society 22, 1 (Fall 1995): 7-24.

19. Louis Smith's earlier American Democracy and Military Power covers much of the same empirical territory and continues to be informative. It is considerably less ambitious theoretically, however, and this helps explain why it is largely unfamiliar to current audiences. The classic work before World War II is Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1937). Huntington claims that his predecessors and intellectual competitors only produced "a confused and unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the underlying premises of American liberalism. . . [theory that is] obsolete in that it is rooted in a hierarchy of values which is of dubious validity in the contemporary world. "Huntington, Soldier and State, vii.

20. And, one might add, Huntington's theory thrives in part because its many vigorous critics have an interest in preserving the vitality of their principal foil.

21. See Weigley, "The American Military," 31, n. 8.

22. Huntington, Soldier and State, viii. See also 84-85.

23. It is important to note that Marxism is "anti-military" in that it opposes the Weberian ideal-type military mind, as Huntington defines it: a world view that sees man as inherently evil, history as cyclical, power as essentially military, threats as ubiquitous, and foreign policy best conducted in a minimal, unadventuresome fashion. Marxism sees man as inherently good, history as progressive, power as essentially economic, threats as limited to class warfare, and foreign policy best conducted in a revolutionary fashion. Huntington allows, obviously, for a putatively Marxist "antimilitary" state like the Soviet Union nevertheless to build a huge military establishment with global reach and global import. Huntington, Soldier and State, 79 and 92.

24. The functional and societal imperatives should not be confused with the problematique itself, which is logically prior to explaining changes in civilian control. The problematique speaks more to the why of civilian control than the how-the former being a question that is rarely made explicit in Huntington's theory. Huntington, Soldier and State, 2 and 156.

25. Although Huntington's objective/subjective typology is the most influential legacy of Soldier and the State, Huntington did not in fact make extensive use of it in his subsequent empirical analysis of American military history. Moreover, in a 1977 retrospective, Huntington preferred to emphasize the extirpation-transmutation typology at the expense of objective or subjective control. He also added a third alternative reflecting his original policy recommendation, toleration, when societal values shift from liberalism in the direction of conservatism. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in Civil-Military Relations, ed. Andrew W. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington: American Enterprise Institute; 1977), 5-28. The original extirpation-transmutation distinction is in Soldier and the State, 155156.

26. Huntington states his claim with characteristic directness towards the close of the book: "The requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure" (464). Quotes in the body of the article are to 456 and 457, respectively.

27. In the epilogue to Soldier and the State, rarely quoted by political scientists, Huntington paints a disparaging portrait of Highland Falls, the Norman Rockwellian village to the south of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He contrasts it with the order and serenity of West Point itself and appeals

for the triumph of the latter over the former. "West Point embodies the military ideal at its best; Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace. West Point is a gray island in a many colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon; Yet is it possible to deny that the military values-loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication-are the ones America most needs today? That the disciplined order of West Point has more to offer than the garish individualism of Main Street? (465). Ironically, the shrinkage in budgets occasioned by the end of the Cold War may be giving West Point a Darwinian victory over Highland Falls' "small town commercialism." The cash-starved military academy has started to compensate for lost appropriations with revenues generated from new onbase retail businesses aimed at the cadet population. Because of tax advantages, the new military businesses are thriving, easily besting the civilian competition from Highland Falls. See Evelyn Nieves, "Sir! We're Losing Our Shirts, Sir!," New York Times, 12 May 1996, p. 29.

28. Quotes are from Huntington, Soldier and State, 83 and 84, respectively. See also especially 74. Of course, the military can not enjoy autonomy on all matters touching on military affairs. Huntington argues that civilians must decide grand strategy matters and leave the lower level operational/tactical decisions in military hands. As I argue in the text, however, drawing the line between strategic and operational matters h s proven extremely difficult nd resulted in numerous viol tions of Huntington's ide lized division of l bor.

29. Huntington documents this in Soldier nd St te. Louis Smith provides supporting evidence in Americ n Democracy and Military Power, as does Allan R. Millett, "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective," Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy Sciences, Number 4, 1979.

30. Michael Desch adds an additional independent variable, internal threat, which produces an interesting reformulation of Huntington's hypothesis that gets more variation while not being much finer-grained. Desch abandons, however, Huntington's objective-subjective measure of the dependent variable in his "Losing Control?" The assertive-delegative typology also addresses this problem with a more nuanced measure of the pattern of civilian control. Peter Feaver, "An American Crisis in Civilian Control and Civil-Military Relations?" The Tocqueville Review 17, 1 (1996): 159-184.

31. See Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 9-11.

32. All quotes to Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 26 and 11.

33. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 11-13.

34. Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, 1 (January 1995) 65-78.

35. Because of space constraints I do not discuss two additional alternative explanations in the text: (I) the Marxist explanation that ideology is epiphenomenal and that adequate military security was supplied because of the material economic interests of the military-industrial complex; and (2) Aaron Friedberg's explanation for why Lasswell's garrison-state never materialized, namely that nuclear deterrence permitted security on the cheap. I would argue that Friedberg provides a better rebuttal to the Marxist critique of Huntington than he does an alternative to Huntington himself. Cold War budgets may seem cheap in retrospect but only in comparison to an idealized maximum. And, despite the efforts of academic strategists, no U.S. government ever acted as if nuclear deterrence alone sufficed. Cold War military budgets remained high, much higher than Huntington expected when he wrote in 1957. These are not, then, satisfactory saves to Huntington's theory. Rosen, Testing the Theory of the Military-industrial Complex. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" International Security 16, 4 (Spring 1992): 109-142.

36. Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Peter D. Feaver, "CivilMilitary Conflict and the Use of Force."

37. Richard Betts, Soldiers Statesmen and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 11; and David H. Petraeus, "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1987), 115-126.

38. The success of Desert Storm, where such micromanagement was apparently not evident, offers further support. It is not clear, however, that the conventional wisdom is correct on how hands-off the civilian leadership was during Desert Storm. Likewise, it is not obvious that solicitude to civilian direction is what produced the problem in Vietnam. The more general proposition that civilian micromanagement produces failure remains unproven conventional wisdom, deserving further careful empirical study. On Desert Storm see: Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 225, 347, 364-365, and 368; Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press Morningside Edition, 1991), 223; Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 94-96, and 122; H. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 325326, 361-362, 441445. For an argument that the Army was insufficiently attentive to civilian direction, see Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 49-75.

39. Interestingly, in his 1977 update, Huntington did not discuss these traditional measures of professionalism, adopting instead the Janowitzean language of congruence/ convergence. For Huntington, congruence with civilian institutions-measured in terms of personnel, function, and structure-varies negatively with professionalism: the greater the congruence the less the military is professional. During the early Cold War, Huntington saw greater congruence (hence lesser professionalism), but he saw the trends reversing in the early 1970s with the abandonment of the draft and the

decline of ROTC at elite schools. Thus, albeit using different measures, Huntington could argue that professionalism declined with civilian interference. Such a defense of hypothesis #3, however, would cut against the logic undergirding hypothesis #2, which held that professionalism accompanied an increase in military security: Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," 22-25.

40. Indeed, Finer argues that some features of professionalism may even encourage the military to subvert civilian control. For instance, professionalism increases military capacity to act decisively, thus enabling the military to accomplish difficult tasks such as a coup. Moreover, there is a tendency among professional armies to see themselves as "servants of the state rather than the government in power," thus weakening the authority of individual civilian leaders: Finer, Man on Horseback, 24-27. Others have echoed Finer's critique, notably Janowitz, discussed in the text, and Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

41. Welch, Civilian Control of the Military. Alain Rouquie, in his review of military history in Latin America , advances the polar opposite thesis of Huntington: that civilian government tended to be supreme until the military professionalized, indeed the military could only coup after they had gone through this modernization phase and enjoyed the autonomy Huntington recommends. Rouquie, The Military and the State, 72-116. Also Stepan, The Military in Politics.

42. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier.

43. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 418.

44. David R. Segal, "National Security and Democracy in the United States," Armed Forces & Society 20, 3 (Spring 1994): 375-394.

45. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 435.

46. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 367-369.

47. Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 2, 1 (Spring 1974) 62.

48. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 363-367.

49. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 350-360.

50. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 439440.

51 . The terms are Arthur Larson's in Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," 624.

52. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 440.

53. Larson, "Military Professionalism," 62.

54. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 420.

55. In contrast with Huntington, moreover, Janowitz's understanding of civilian control is not specified in cause-effect hypotheses and so does not lend itself to traditional hypothesis testing.

56. Charles Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," Armed Forces dE Society 4, 1 (Pall 1977) 41-50. Moskos and Woods, The Military: More Than Just a Job.

57. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control," 65.

58. Elsewhere I have proposed such a theory drawing upon insights from microeconomics' principal-agent framework. Peter D. Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations," Working Paper No. 4 of the Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, May 1996.

59. Bernard Boene, "How 'Unique' Should the Military Be?" passim.

60. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. For a recent emphatic recapitulation of this argument, see David W. Tarr and Peter J. Roman, "Serving the Commanderin-Chief: Advice and Dissent" (paper presented at the 1995 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago Hilton Towers, 31 August-3 September 1995), and Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "Soldiers, Presidents, and the Use of Force in the Post Cold War" (paper presented at the 1995 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago Hilton Towers, 31 August-3 September 1995).

61. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 10.

62. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 10.

63. For this reason, Tarr and Roman's related claim that civil and military actors are "functionally indistinguishable" on decisions concerning the use of force is also unhelpful. Roles overlap, but the military and the civilian players know who is military and who is civilian and, of course, it matters for how each player's advice and interests get considered. Tarr and Roman, "Serving the Commander-in-Chief," 20-22.

64. Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, 17.

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